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Abstract. Between February 14, 2019 and March 4, 2019, a terrorist
attack in Pulwama, Kashmir followed by retaliatory air strikes led to
rising tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed countries.
In this work, we examine polarizing messaging on Twitter during these
events, particularly focusing on the positions of Indian and Pakistani
politicians. We use label propagation technique focused on hashtag co-
occurences to find polarizing tweets and users. Our analysis reveals that
politicians in the ruling political party in India (BJP) used polarized
hashtags and called for escalation of conflict more so than politicians
from other parties. Our work offers the first analysis of how escalating
tensions between India and Pakistan manifest on Twitter and provides
a framework for studying polarizing messages.
Keywords: Polarization · Hashtags · Political communication strategies
1 Introduction
While social media platforms foster open communication and have the potential
to offer more democratic information systems, they have simultaneously facil-
itated divisions in society by allowing the spread of polarizing and incendiary
content [25,57]. Polarizing content can be beneficial by encouraging pride and
solidarity, but it has also become a social cyber-security concern: foreign and
domestic actors may employ polarizing social media content to sow divisions in
a country, to demean other nations, or to promote political agendas [4,16,18,38].
Using automated methods to analyze social media offers a way to understand
the type of content users are exposed to, the positions taken by various users,
and the agendas pursued through coordinated messaging across entire platforms.
Understanding the dynamics of this information landscape has become critical,
because social media can strongly influence public opinion [16]. However, prior
computational social science research on polarization has focused primarily on
U.S. politics, and much attention has focused on the influence of Russian or
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Chinese state actors [4,5,25,33,38,42,55,57]. In contrast, we focus on polarizing
social media content in India and Pakistan and how it can contribute to rising
tensions between these two nations. Specifically, we examine communication pat-
terns on Twitter following the terrorist attack in the Pulwama district, Jammu
and Kashmir, India, on February 14, 2019.
We primarily investigate the research question: to what extent did entities on
social media advocate for or against escalating tensions?. India and Pakistan are
both nuclear-armed countries and have a decades-long history involving multiple
armed conflicts. The Pulwama attack in 2019 was followed by an escalation
of tensions between these two nations that nearly approached full-fledged war
[29,49,50]. Moreover, the relationship between these countries is an important
agenda for political parties in both India and Pakistan. India has two primary
political parties: the Indian National Congress (INC), which was dominant in
the early 21st century, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which rose to
prominence on a populist and nationalist platform in 2014 and has been in
power since [44]. We examine how the social media messaging of members of
these parties differed, and how it changed over the sequence of events.
Our core methodology uses a network-based label propagation algorithm
to quantifying the polarity of hashtags along specified dimensions: Pro-India
vs. Pro-Pakistan and Pro-Aggression vs. Pro-Peace. We then aggregate the
hashtag-level scores into tweet-level and user-level scores, e.g. the polarity of
a given user on a given day. Unlike methodology that assumes users’ opinions do
not change [22,23,67], focuses on binary stances [15], or requires in-language an-
notations and feature-crafting [43], our methodology allows us to analyze degrees
of polarization in a multilingual corpus and how they change over time.
We begin by providing an overview of the events between February 14 and
March 1, 2019 (§2). Next, we describe the Twitter data collection (§3) and discuss
methods (§4) and evaluation (§5). Our results (§6) suggest that more members
of the BJP propagated a narrative of escalation than members of other political
parties. This finding supports anecdotes reported by journalists [66] about these
events. Through this research, we develop (1) the first analysis of escalating
tensions between India and Pakistan on Twitter, (2) a data-driven investigation
of social media messaging following the 2019 Pulwama attack, and (3) a novel
and general methodology to examine polarization on multilingual social media.
2 Timeline of Events
We briefly provide background on relevant events, relying primarily on third
party newspapers unaffiliated with either nation (The New York Times and
BBC News) and noting where official accounts differ.
Feb. 14, 2019 A 22-year old native of Pulwama carried out a suicide attack
against a convoy carrying approximately 2,500 security personnel in the Pul-
wama district in Kashmir, India. The attack resulted in the death of more than
40 Indian soldiers. Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) a militant group based in Pakistan
(the group is formally banned in Pakistan) claimed responsibility [8,35,61,62].
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Feb. 14-26, 2019 The Indian government responded to the attack with
threats of retaliation against Pakistan, even though Pakistani officials denied
any role [9,10,64]. Diplomatic ties deteriorated, e.g., India revoked Pakistan’s
most favored nation status, which had provided trade advantages [13]. Pakistan
threatened to retaliate if India pursued military action [11].
Feb. 26, 2019 The Indian Air Force (IAF) conducted a retaliatory airstrike
against a JeM training camp inside Pakistan, which the Indian government
termed “non-military, preemptive” [60]. According to Indian government offi-
cials, the JeM camp targeted by this airstrike was located 70km inside the Line
of Control (LoC) – the military line dividing the Indian and Pakistani controlled
parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian officials reported that the airstrike was “100
percent successful”, went on “exactly as planned”, and killed over 200 terror-
ists [48,60]. In contrast, Pakistani officials reported that the target of the attacks
was located only 5–6km inside the LoC, that the Pakistani air force turned back
the Indian fighters, and that the attacks landed in an empty area [24,58].
Feb. 27, 2019 The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) carried out retaliatory airstrikes
along the LoC. Indian and Pakistani officials presented different details of the
strikes, but both emphasized de-escalation: a Pakistani official reported that the
PAF intentionally targeted open spaces, to demonstrate Pakistan’s capabilities
without inviting escalation, while an Indian official reported no deaths or civil-
ian casualties [20,21,26]. However, in aerial combat following the strikes, an IAF
pilot was captured by the Pakistani Army [7,59].
Mar. 1, 2019 Pakistan returned the IAF pilot to India on March 1 in what
Pakistani Prime Minster Imran Khan called “a gesture of peace” [6].
3 Data
We collected tweets related to these events by first identifying a set of relevant
hashtags. Our hashtag set is based on hashtags related to #pulwama found on
best-hashtags.com.1 We modified the hashtag set to ensure that it included
both hashtags more likely to be used by Pro-India users (e.g., IndiaWantsRe-
venge) and hashtags more likely to be used by Pro-Pakistan users (e.g., Pak-
istanZindabad). We then collected all tweets using these terms, either as words
or as hashtags during the events. We provide further details, including the full
list of keywords and evidence that our data set is comprehensive in Appendix 8.
Our final data set contains 2.5M unique tweets (including retweets) from
567K users that use 67K unique hashtags. All tweets occurred between February
14th and March 4th. The data contains a mix of languages including English,
Urdu, and Hindi, and many users use multiple languages in the same tweet.
While some tweets express neutral opinions, others contain incendiary language,
such as: “@PMOIndia @PMOIndia @narendramodi We r eagerly waiting for
1 best-hashtags.com uses an algorithm to provide popular hashtags that are simi-
lar to the provided seed (#pulwama). Since our analysis, the website has stopped
reporting Twitter hashtags.
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ur action of revenge...#PulwamaRevenge #IndiaWantsRevenge #PulwamaAt-
tack” and “I feel time has come to give all support to #Balochistan activist. Let
us #bleed Pakistan from all fronts. #NeverForget @PMOIndia @narendramodi
#IndiaWantsRevenge”. In in Appendix 8, we provide further statistics on the
data, including network densities.
4 Methodology
We develop a method to assign a polarity score to an aggregate group of tweets,
and we analyze how polarities change over time for different groups of users.
For instance, given pole A (e.g., Pro-Pakistan) and pole B (e.g., Pro-India),
we aggregate all tweets by a given user and assign the user a polarity score
between [a, b], where a score close to a indicates the user more likely supports
A and a score close to b indicates the user more likely supports B. We could
also aggregate only tweets by the user on one day and determine the user’s
Pro-A/Pro-B polarity on that day.
In the absence of annotated data, we use a weakly supervised approach.
First, for pole A, we hand-select a small seed set of tokens SA that are strongly
associated with A, and we equivalently hand-select SB . We assign each s ∈ SA a
polarity score of a, and we assign each s ∈ SB a polarity score of b. Then, we use
SA and SB to infer polarity scores over a larger lexicon of words or hashtags V,
where each w ∈ V is assigned a score in [a, b]. Finally, we estimate the polarity
of an aggregated set of tweets by summing or averaging the inferred polarity
scores for all w ∈ V used in those tweets.
In order to propagate the hand-annotated labels in SA and SB to the larger
lexicon V, we use 3 variants of graph-based label propagation. In each variant,
we construct a graph G, whose nodes consist of w ∈ V and whose edges and
edge weights are defined based on similarity metrics between members of V. We
describe each variant in detail below.
Network-based Hashtag Propagation In the first variant, we define V to be the set
of all hashtags used in our data set. Then, we construct G as a hashtag*hashtag
co-occurrence network. Each node in G corresponds to a hashtag. Edges oc-
cur between hashtags that co-occur in the same tweet, and edge weights are
proportional to how frequently the hashtags co-occur. Then, we use the label
propagation algorithm detailed in Algorithm 1 to infer polarity scores for w ∈ V
from SA and SB , where a = −1 and b = 1. The algorithm uses a greedy approach
to assign labels to each node in G. If all nodes connected to a node n have been
labeled, then node n is assigned a weighted average of all the adjacent nodes.
This step is repeated until the maximum possible number of nodes are labeled
(γ controls the number of repetitions).
Our algorithm is similar to methods used to infer user-level polarities, in
which small seed of users is hand-annotated and a graph-based algorithm prop-
agates labels to other users by assuming that users who retweet each other share
the same views [23,67]. Similar to above work, work by [32] also quantifies polar-
ity based on the graph structure and assumes that the controversial topics induce
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clusters of discussions, commonly referred to as echo-chambers However, we con-
duct propagation at a hashtag level, by assuming that hashtags that frequently
occur in the same tweets indicate similar polarities. Also, our approach does not
assume homophily in retweet network nor that user polarities are constant over
time.
Network-based Word Propagation The second variant is similar to the first; how-
ever, instead of restricting V to be the set of hashtags in the corpus, we define V
to be the set of all tokens, including words and hashtags. We then construct G
as a token*token co-occurrence network, and as above, we infer labels using Al-
gorithm 1 and obtain token-level polarity scores in the range [-1, 1]. Expanding
V to all tokens instead of just hashtags allows our algorithm to incorporate more
information, but also risks introducing noise, as we do not attempt to process
nuances in language like negation.
Embedding-based Word Propagation (SentProp) In the third variant, we define
V to be the set of all tokens, as in the Network-based Word Propagation ap-
proach. Then, we train GloVe embeddings [51] over our entire corpus (limiting
vocabulary size to 50K). We then use SentProp [34], a method for inferring
domain-specific lexicons to infer labels over V. In this method, as before, we
construct a graph G where each w ∈ V is a node. However, rather than relying
on raw co-occurrence scores, SentProp uses embedding similarity metrics to de-
fine edge weights and a random-walk method to propagate labels. We implement
SentProp using the SocialSent package [34], where a = 0 and b = 1.
Algorithm 1: Label Propagation Algorithm
Input: Graph G with nodes n and edges e with eij as the edge weight between
i ∈ n and j ∈ n
initialize γ = 50/100 and i=0;
for each n do
define l = integer(i/γ); i+=1;
for each n do
if n not labeled then
compute t = neighbors of n;
compute tl = labeled neighbors of n;
if |tl|+ l ≥ t then
initialize score, c
for each ti ∈ t do
score += label ti ∗ enti ; c += enti
update label n = score/c
Once we have obtained hashtag-level or word-level polarity scores, we infer
the polarity of a tweet or a group of tweets (e.g. all tweets by a given user) by
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averaging the polarity scores inferred by our algorithms for all the hashtags and
words used in data subset. This approach is similar to the aggregation conducted
in [15], but our label propagation allows for the incorporation of thousands of
words and hashtags, rather than relying on only a small hand-annotated set. If
the data subset does not contain any of the keywords labelled by our algorithm
(e.g. in a hashtag-based approach, the tweet contains no hashtags), we consider
it unclassified. In some cases, primarily for evaluation, we convert the polarity
scores into a ternary negative/neutral/positive position by using the cut-offs
{< 0, 0, > 0} for the [−1, 1] scale and {< 0.5, 0.5, > 0.5} for the [0, 1] scale.
This methodology allows us to infer the polarity of any group of tweets
along any dimensions, provided a small set of seed words or hashtags for each
dimension. Thus, we can examine how polarities differed for different groups
of users and how they changed over time. The two dimensions we focus on
are Pro-India/Pro-Pakistan and Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression, and we provide our
manually defined seed sets in Appendix 9. In practice we found that variations
in the exact words in seed set had no noticeable impact on our final results.
For the network-based methods, we label Pro-India seeds as +1, Pro-Pakistan
seeds as −1, Pro-Peace seeds as +1, and Pro-Aggression seeds as −1. For the
embedding-based approach, we label Pro-India seeds as +1 Pro-Pakistan seeds
as 0, Pro-Peace seeds as +1, and Pro-Aggression seeds as 0. For all word-based
approaches, we limit the vocabulary size to 50K.
Table 1. Classification results for the 100 most followed Indian and Pakistan Twitter
accounts, where Pro-India or Pro-Pakistan are treated as the dominant class, and the
nationality of the account owner is treated as a gold label. Accounts that our algorithm
was unable to classify (% Unk) are not included in precision and recall scores.
Pro-India Pro-Pakistan
Prec. Recall % Unk. Prec. Recall % Unk.
Hashtag 0.91 0.78 0.68 0.90 0.96 0.36
Word 0.69 0.91 0.24 0.84 0.54 0.34
Sentprop 0.49 0.80 - 0.43 0.15 -
5 Evaluation
Automated Evaluation We first evaluate our methods by focusing on the Pro-
India and Pro-Pakistan dimension and assuming that popular users in India are
more likely to post Pro-India content and popular users in Pakistan are more
likely to post Pro-Pakistan content. From the Socialbakers.com platform, we
identified the 100 most followed Twitter accounts in India and in Pakistan. 16 of
the Indian accounts and 15 of the Pakistani accounts do not occur in our data,
leaving 84 Indian accounts with 2,199 tweets and 85 Pakistani accounts with
1,456 tweets for evaluation. For each account, we average words and hashtag
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polarities over all tweets from the account, and binarize the resulting score into
Pro-Pakistan or Pro-India position.
Table 1 reports precision and recall scores when we treat Pro-India as the
primary class and when we treat Pro-Pakistan as the primary class. Both of the
network-based approaches rely on hashtag or word co-occurrences to propagate
labels. Thus, hashtags and words that do not have any co-occurrence links to
the original seed list are unable to be labeled. For instance, in the hashtag
propagation approach, our method labels 41,700 hashtags out of 67,059 total
hashtags in the dataset. Any users who only use unlabeled words or hashtags are
therefore unable to be classified by our algorithm, resulting in 88/169 unlabeled
accounts for the hashtag approach and and 49/169 unlabeled accounts for the
word approach (% Unk in Table 1). In contrast, SentProp obtains polarity scores
for all accounts, as it relies on embedding similarity and can propagate labels
between words, even if they do not ever co-occur.
However, although Sentprop labels more accounts, its precision is much lower
than the network-based methods. The network-based hashtag propagation ap-
proach overall obtains the highest precision. Although the word-propagation
approach labels more accounts and works well over the Indian accounts, its clas-
sification of the Pakistani accounts (e.g. Recall) is close to random. We suspect
that our method works well for hashtags, because they tend to be strongly po-
lar and indicative of the overall sentiment of the tweet. Also, users tend to use
English hashtags even though they may be tweeting in other languages. A word-
based approach likely requires more careful handling of subtle language cues like
negation or sarcasm.
In our subsequent analysis, we use the network-based hashtag propagation
method in order to infer polarities, thus favoring high precision and strong po-
larization, and choosing not to analyze data where we cannot infer polarity with
high-confidence. Additionally, in examining the data set, we found that many
of the top-followed accounts in India and Pakistan consisted of celebrities who
avoided taking stances on politicized issues, which makes the high number of
unclassified accounts in this subset of the data unsurprising.
Table 2. Inter-annotator agreement and classification accuracy over 100 manually
annotated data points
Krippendorff α % Agree. Hashtag Acc. Soft Hashtag Acc.
India/Pakistan 0.77 88% 74% 89%
Aggression/Peace 0.60 74% 57% 76%
Manual Evaluation In order to further evaluate our methods, we compare
the performance of the network-based hashtag model with a small sample of
manually annotated tweets. We randomly sampled 100 users from our data set.
For each user, we randomly sampled 1 day on which the user tweeted and ag-
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gregated all tweets from that day. Thus, we conduct this evaluation at a per-
user-per-day level. Two annotators independently annotated each data sam-
ple as Pro-India/Pro-Pakistan/Neutral/Can’t Determine and Pro-Peace/Pro-
Aggression/Neutral/Can’t Determine. For simplicity, we collapsed Neutral/Can’t
Determine and Unclassified into a single “Neutral” label. Notably, these dimen-
sions are distinct. For example, users may write tweets that are Pro-Peace and
Pro-Pakistan: “Dont let people pull you into their War, pull them into your
Peace... Peace for our World, Peace for our Children, Peace for our Future
!! #PakSymbolOfPeace #SayNoToWar” or that are Pro-Peace and Pro-India:
“Very mature conciliatory speech by #ImranKhan. We now urge him to walk the
talk. Please return our #Abhinandan safely back to us. This will go a long way
in correcting perceptions and restoring peace. #SayNoToWar”.
Table 2 reports inter-annotator agreement, which is generally high. Addition-
ally, most disagreements occurred when one annotator labeled Neutral/Can’t
Determine and the other did not, meaning polar opposite annotations were rare.
If we only count polar opposite labels as disagreements, the percent agreement
rises to 94% for both dimensions.
Then, the two annotators discussed any data points for which they initially
disagreed and decided on a single gold label for each data point. We compare
performance of the network-based hashtag propagation method against these
gold annotations in Table 2. In this 3-way classification task, our method out-
performs random guessing. In particular, the “Soft” accuracy, in which we only
consider the model output to be incorrect if it predicted the polar-opposite label,
meaning neutral/unclassified predictions are not considered incorrect, is high for
both dimensions. We provide further metrics and discussion in Appendix 10.
6 Results and Analysis
We investigate multiple aspects of our data set, including network structure, po-
larities of various entities, and changes over time. Based on prior work suggesting
that political entities in India and Pakistan may use social media to influence
public opinion [2,3,40,54], we pay particular attention to the Twitter accounts
of politicians as a method for uncovering political agendas.
Table 3. Overall polarities of users and tweets.
Position Unique Users Total Tweets Position Unique Users Total Tweets
Pro-India 125K (23%) 1.16M (46%) Pro-Aggression 78K (14%) 626K (25%)
Pro-Pakistan 117K (20%) 764K (30%) Pro-Peace 252K (45%) 1.48M (59%)
Unclassified 325K (57%) 578K (23%) Unclassified 237K (40%) 351K (16%)
What are the overall polarities of our data set? In Table 3, we obtain polar-
ity scores for each user and tweet and then ternarize them into Pro-India/Pro-
Pakistan/Unclassified and as Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression/Unclassified in the same
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Fig. 1. 30-core all communication networks, colored by Pro-India/Pro-Pakistan polar-
ity (left) and Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression polarity (right). The Pro-India/Pro-Pakistan
network displays more homophily than the Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression network.
way as in §5. At the user level, the classified accounts are approximately bal-
anced between Pro-India and Pro-Pakistan. However, at a tweet level, the clas-
sified data contains a high percentage of Pro-India tweets, which suggests that
Pro-India users tweeted about this issue more prolifically. On the Pro-Peace/Pro-
Aggression dimension, there is a much higher percentage of Pro-Peace users than
Pro-Aggression users. This pattern also holds at a tweet level, where only a small
percentage of tweets are unclassified.
What are characteristics of the communication network? Next, we examine the
communication network between users, particularly prevalence of echo cham-
bers. Did users with opposite positions interact on Twitter? Figure 1 shows
a 30-core all communication network constructed using ORA-PRO [17]. Ac-
counts are colored based on their Pro-India/Pro-Pakistan polarity (left) and
Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression polarity (right). An edge occurs between two users if
one user retweeted, mentioned, or replied to the other and users with fewer than
30 links are not shown. Unsurprisingly, the Pro-India/Pro-Pakistan position is
highly segregated, with little interaction between users with different positions.
In contrast, the Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression dimension is more mixed. Although
there are some areas of high density for each position, there is interaction between
users of different positions. These interactions are potential avenues for users to
influence each other’s views. Appendix 11 additionally reports network densities
for the derived network: We find a higher density in the Pro-Aggression commu-
nity than the Pro-Peace community for all communication types, meaning the
Pro-Aggression community is closer-knit. Similarly, we find a closer Pro-India
community as compared to the Pro-Pakistan community.
How polarized were different political entities? We investigate the polarities pro-
jected by different political entities: specifically BJP politicians (currently in
power in India), INC politicians (largest opposition party), other Indian politi-
cians, and Pakistani politicians.
We first used Socialbakers platform to obtain the Twitter handles of the
100 most followed politicians in India and in Pakistan (as in §5). Our data set
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Fig. 2. Aggregate Pro-Peace and Pro-Aggression polarities of the most popular Indian
(33/78) and Pakistani (36/66) politicians in our data set (left) and of members of
Indian political parties (right)
contained tweets from 66 Pakistani politicians and 78 Indian politicians, and our
model was able to infer polarity scores for 36 Pakistani politicians and 33 Indian
politicians. On the left in Figure 2, we report aggregate polarity scores over all
tweets from these politicians. Politicians from Pakistan were predominately Pro-
Peace, while Indian politicians expressed more mixed polarities, resulting in a
near neutral aggregate score.
We then examined a broader set of Indian politicians, subdivided by political
party based on a list of members running for parliament elections in 2019 [41].
Out of the 1,360 twitter handles in list list, our data set contained activity from
316 BJP accounts, 281 INC accounts, 204 other Indian party accounts.
On the right in Figure 2 we show the overall polarities, aggregated from all
tweets by verified members of each party. Strikingly, members of the BJP party
are positioned as much more Pro-Aggression than the members of either the INC
or other Indian parties, and the party overall obtains a Pro-Aggression polarity
score 2. This score is not dominated by 1-2 strongly polarized members of the
party: if we aggregate the polarity scores by individuals instead of by party, 15%
of BJP members had net Pro-Aggression scores and 13% had net Pro-Peace
scores. In comparison, 10% of the INC members had net Pro-Aggression scores
and 25% had net Pro-Peace scores. 6% of other Indian party members were
classified as Pro-Aggression and 29% were classified as Pro-Peace.
These results support observations made by journalists and community mem-
bers about the role of the BJP party in these events. BJP is well-known for pro-
moting nationalism, and several journalists have speculated that conflict with
Pakistan would increase Prime Minister Modi’s chances of winning the upcoming
elections in April and accused the BJP of war-mongering [27,31,45,63].
How did polarization change over time? Figure 3 shows how this polarity changed
over the two-week period of events: we infer a Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression polar-
ity score for all tweets posted by members of the specified political subgroup,
and we plot the average score across tweets posted each day.
2 Examples of pro-aggression tweets by BJP members can be found in §11
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Fig. 3. Daily Pro-Peace/Pro-Aggression positions of political entities. Negative values
denote Pro-Aggression stance and positive values denote Pro-Peace. The error bars
represent 1 standard deviation.
Immediately following the initial attack on 2/14, the tweets from all Indian
political party members were inclined towards Pro-Aggression, suggesting initial
outrage. However, over the next few days, while members of the INC and other
Indian political parties switch towards Pro-Peace, members of the BJP party
were consistently positioned with Pro-Aggression polarity. There is high volatil-
ity between 2/20 and 2/26. However, there was a much lower volume of tweets
about the Pulwama incidents during this time period (tweet volume is reported
in Appendix 11), and we do not believe these fluctuations are meaningful. The
volume of tweets increases once again following the Indian airstrike on 2/26 and
the Pakistani airstrike on 2/27. Tweets by Pakistani politicians generally fall on
the Pro-Peace side, but they become more polarized after the Indian airstrike
and reach a peak following the Pakistani airstrike. This is consistent with re-
ported quotes by Pakistani officials (§2), saying that the airstrike was designed to
avoid escalation. Similarly, tweets by Indian politicians from the INC and other
parties become strongly Pro-Peace directly following the Indian airstrike, with
polarity increasing after the Pakistani airstrike. In contrast, on the day of the
Pakistani airstrike, tweets by BJP politicians remain Pro-Aggression, possibly
focusing either on praise for the Indian airstrike or condemnation of the Pak-
istani airstrike. The polarity of the BJP tweets belatedly switches to Pro-Peace
on the following day (2/28), though the strength of the Pro-Aggression polarity
still remained weaker for BJP tweets than for tweets by other politicians.
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7 Discussion and Related Work
The potential that social media platforms have for manipulating public opinion
has led to growing interest in information operations and the development of
social cyber security as a field of research [18,55]. While we do not claim that
social media coverage of the Pulwama incident constituted an information op-
eration, e.g. coordinated efforts to manipulate public opinion and change how
people perceive events [55], we do find similarities between our observations and
other work in this area. Notably, as described in §2, the Indian and Pakistani
governments maintain starkly different accounts about the events that occurred,
particularly whether or not the 2/26 airstrikes resulted in 200 casualties. Simi-
larly, Russian and Ukranian governments circulated conflicting narratives about
the cause of the crash Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014, which prompted
analyses of information operations about this incident. In a work similar to ours,
[33] examine social media coverage of the incident by using a set of hashtags to
collect all relevant tweets during a set time frame. Other work has examined
the media influence of Chinese and Russian state actors in various domains, in-
cluding US and UK elections and the Syrian War [30,38,39,53,56]. [4] examine
Russian influence in polarizing movements on Twitter, particularly the #Black-
LivesMatterMovement, and observe how Russian actors attempted to increase
tensions between involved parties. Furthermore, the polarization that we observe
in our data align with the “Excite” and “Dismay” strategies, which are tools of
public opinion manipulation described in the BEND forms of maneuver [12].
Almost all of these works are focused on U.S. social media, possibly involving
Chinese and Russian actors. In general, most work on polarization and public
opinion change has focused on U.S. politics [19,23,37], with a few exceptions fo-
cusing on Germany [22], Egypt [15,67], and Venezuela [46]. Work on social media
in India and Pakistan has focused on healthcare [1], natural disasters [47], self-
promotion (e.g. “brand marketing”) primarily in relation to elections [2,3,40], or
on election forecasting [36,54], though [65] does argue that the Pakistan Army
uses social media to subvert democracy. While these works only focus on intra-
country analysis, our work also examines tensions between India and Pakistan.
A small selection of work has also looked at the incidents in Pulwama and the
implications of rising tensions. [29] and [50] discuss the sociopolitical context
and implications of events from a non-computational perspective. [49] addition-
ally conduct a social media analysis, but they use YouTube data and focus on
identifying deescalating language. Their timeline of escalation and deescalation
is generally consistent with our findings.
Our primary methodology involves using label propagation to infer aggre-
gated polarity scores. In language corpora, label propagation has typically relied
on embedding similarity [34,52]. Our approach takes advantage of the short-
text nature of Twitter through co-occurrences networks, as well as the strong
semantic signals provided by hashtags [28].
Conclusions Polarizing language on social media can have long-lasting so-
ciopolitical impacts. Our analysis shows how Twitter users in India and Pakistan
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used polarizing language during a period of escalating tensions between the two
nations, and our methodology offers tools for future work in this area.
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Appendix
8 Data Collection and Statistics
We collected Twitter data using the Twitter API. The API collects all tweets
that have provided keywords from the last 7 days. We hence collected data on
February 20th, February 26th Feb and March 4th to obtain all tweets during
the relevant time period. All the data collection was done using the keywords
given below except “Balakot” and “Abhinandan”, which were added after the
airstrikes. We de-duplicated the collected tweets to remove tweets collected twice
during multiple collection runs.
To check whether our keywords covered most of the debate on these events,
we scraped the timelines of 100 most-followed politicians in India and Pakistan
during the incidents. For Pakistan politicians, we found that 1566 tweets were in
our original keyword-based collection of tweets and 333 tweets were not part of
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our collection. On manual inspection, out of the total 333, only 40 tweets were
found to be related to Pulwama and the rest were not relevant. For Indian politi-
cians, we found that 2615 tweets were in the original keyword-based collection
and 70 tweets were not, out of which only 23 tweets were found to be related to
the incident. Thus, we believe our data set contains comprehensive coverage of
tweets related to these events.
Keywords used for data collection: PulwamaAttack, Pulwama, TerroristArmy,
PhulwamaTerrorAttack, PhulwamaRevenge, KashmirTerror, PakistanZindaba,
KashmiriStudents, KashmirBleeds, KashmirBanegaPakistan, JihadKashmir, Sur-
gicalStrike, SayNoToWar, JeM, JaisheMohammad, Jaish, IndiaWantsRevenge,
Gaddar, FreeKashmir, Fidayin, CrpfConvoyAttack, AzadKashmir, AJK, Bal-
akot, AdilahMaddar, LethopraSuicidalAttack, Abhinandan
Table 4. Data statistics (counts) for tweets collected during and after Pulwama attack.
The values in parentheses are network density values.
Unique Users 567K Mentions 725K (2.25*1e-6)
Total Tweets (Including Retweets) 2.5M Reciprocal 36K (2.2*1e-7)
Total Unique Hashtags 67K Replies 43K (1.3*1e-7)
Total Communication Links 2.3M (7.24*1e-6) Retweets 1.6M (4.9*1e-6)
Min. Tweets/User 1 Max. Tweets/User 3166
Avg. Tweets/User 4.4 SD Tweets/User 13.2
Table 4 reports statistics about the collected data, including the types of
communication present. Twitter allows three types of interactive communica-
tion: mentions (e.g., @username), replies, and retweets. We classify retweets
with comments as retweets. We also define reciprocal communication as two
users mentioning each other, and all communication is the sum of the above
three types of communication. Furthermore, we construct networks for each type
of communication, where users are nodes, and an edge exists between two nodes
if those two users interacted with the specified type of communication. Table 4
reports both the frequency of each communication type in our data set and
the densities of the constructed communication networks. Retweets occur more
frequently and also result in higher network density than other forms of commu-
nication.
9 Seed words for label propagation
Pro-India seeds IndiaWantsRevenge, PhulwamaRevenge, ModiUnstoppable, Ab-
hinandhanMyHero, RespectToIndianArmy, IndiaAgainstTerroristan, JusticeFor-
PhulwamaAttack
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Pro-Pakistan seeds AzadKashmir, KashmirBanegaPakistan, PakistanZindabad,
HindustaanMurdabaad, PakistanArmyGreatArmy, PakistanArmyZindabad, Salute-
ToOurPakistanArmy
Pro-Aggression seeds SayYesToWar, 4kebadle400
Pro-Peace seeds SayNoToWar, SaveHumanity
10 Evaluation Analysis
Sample inferred Pro-Aggression Hashtags stonehearted, pakistantakesrevenge ,
trustarmy, baaphaitumhare, barkhaspreadsporn, planprepare, pakistanamurdabad, in-
diaagainstantinationals, indianarmyourpridd, boycott pakistani players, yh aag na thandi hopaye,
timestorevenge, ab hoga tanav, candleofrevenge, pulawamaislamicterrorattack, india-
musttakerevenge, avengeforpulwamaattack, russiawithmodi,boycottsnehawagh, iamwait-
ingindia
Sample inferred Pro-Peace Hashtags saynotoindopakmedia, savefamily, wekash-
miridontwantwar, southasian, uniteasia, sayyestorobo, letstabletalk, saynotopakprox-
ywar, saynotononsense, doyourjob, neverunderestimate, wecandobetter, wngcmdrab-
hinandan, stopmakingnonsensestatements, yestocricket, pleasenohate, flowersfrompak-
istan, peacepreaching, saynotocheapmedia, indianeedseducatedpm
Table 5. India/Pakistan Confusion Matrix for the manual evaluation described in §5
True Pro-India True Pro-Pakistan True Neutral
Predicted Pro-India 45 1 3
Predicted Pro-Pakistan 10 24 0
Predicted Neutral/Unclassified 10 2 5
Table 6. Aggression/Peace War Confusion Matrix for the manual evaluation described
in §5
True Pro-Aggression True Pro-Peace True Neutral
Predicted Pro-Aggression 21 0 6
Predicted Pro-Peace 24 31 10
Predicted Neutral/Unclassified 2 1 5
Tables 5 and 6 show the confusion matrices for the network-based hashtag prop-
agation method over the manually annotated data set described in §5. In the Pro-
India/Pro-Pakistan dimension, classification accuracy is generally high with few mis-
classified examples. In the Pro-Aggression/Pro-Peace dimension, the most common
error is predicting tweets that are actually Pro-Aggression as Pro-Peace. This er-
ror likely results because numerous Pro-Aggression tweets exhibited “hashjacking”,
in which users co-opting the hashtags preferred adversaries [14,22]. For example:
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“1993 Mumbai
1998 Coimbatore
2001 Parliament attack
2002 Akshardham
2003, 2006 Mumbai trains
2005 Delhi
2006 Varanasi
2007 Samjhauta + Hyderabad
2008 Mumbai 26/11
2016 Uri
2019 Pulwama
Hundreds more...
Did our Pak lovers say #SayNoToWar then? Only applies when India strikes
back?”
“While we were celebrating #Abhinandans return, #Pakistan continued to violate
the ceasefire in J&K. Two jawans were martyred and three civilians including a 5 year
old and a nine month old were killed. And they talk about #peace and #PeaceGestures.
Enough of this double speak!”
As most of our analysis focuses on analyzing pro-aggression polarity, and we have no
evidence that this type of hashjacking was more prevalent for any given sub-group, we
do not expect errors of this type to substantially change our findings. On the contrary,
these types of errors suggest that our analysis is a conservative estimate of the level of
pro-aggression polarity.
Furthermore, of the 100 annotated data points, in the Pro-India/Pro-Pakistan di-
mension, none of them were unclassified. In the pro-Aggression/Pro-Peace dimension,
8 were unclassified. 5 of these were labelled as neutral or Can’t determine by annota-
tors, 2 were labeled pro-aggression, and 1 was labelled pro-peace. Thus, this evaluation
supports our conclusion in §5, that unclassified tweets primarily contain non-polarized
language, and we have no reason to believe that our method fails to classify tweets of
either polarity more often.
11 Additional Data Analysis
Sample inferred pro-aggression tweets by BJP members: ““Pakistan will pay heavy price
for #Pulwama attack. Free hand given to our forces, Terrorists will pay a heavy price,
It’s time to unite for our nation.” - PM Sri @narendramodi, I’am sure our retribution
will make more noise than #JihadiTerror #CRPF #KashmirTerrorAttack”
and “#IndiaWantsRevenge — We need to give a befitting reply to Pakistan, we will
strike back. But people who support the separatists and maoists and even terrorists, the
country does not need them”
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Table 7. Network densities of different derived networks. All values are (×10−5)
Network Type Pro-India Pro-Pakistan Pro-Aggression Pro-Peace
Retweet 3.8 2.8 4.1 1.3
Mention 5 3.4 4 1.6
Reply 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.062
All Communication 5 3.4 5.1 1.6
Fig. 4. Number of Tweets and Retweets by different politicians.
